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ABSTRACT
The influence of senior civil servants’ (SCS) tasks on their role perceptions has been widely ignored in the 
past research on the administrative élite. This paper presents new survey data on SCS in German federal 
ministries to test this relation by categorizing SCS into three task-related groups: strategists, policy 
specialists and administrators. Regression analyses reveal that SCS’s tasks do not influence their (strong) 
identification with reactive (supportive) roles but have a significant impact on their identification with 
active, more politically entrepreneurial roles. This entails two important findings: First, SCS’s tasks matter 
for their appreciation of different roles. Second, active and reactive role models are not irreconcilable (as 
it is often argued in the literature on bureaucratic politicization), but complementary.
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The selection of senior civil servants (SCS) based on 
assumptions on their personal attitudes and professional 
role perceptions is a typical point of entry for political 
attempts to control the civil service. Scholarship mirrors 
this interest: Getting to know who SCS are, what they 
believe and how they interpret their job, what motivates 
them and how their actions are influenced (or con-
trolled) has a long tradition in public administration 
research (e.g., Bach & Veit, 2018; Cooper, 2018; 
Derlien, 2003; Peters & Pierre, 2004). However, as 
Wise (2004, p. 669) points out, contextual factors often 
remain unspecified: “studies assume generic effects from 
one level of bureaucracy to another, as well as from one 
occupational group to another [. . .].” Most empirical 
studies on role perceptions and decision-making ration-
alities of SCS ignore a distinct job-related scope condi-
tion, namely the tasks of the senior bureaucrats. SCS are 
treated as a homogeneous group in this respect, without 
scrutinizing their potential task-related heterogeneity. 
This paper challenges this implicit assumption of homo-
geneity and purports that the tasks assigned to SCS 
might affect their role perceptions. The assumed causal 
mechanism is based in organizational socialization the-
ory (Hatmaker & Park, 2014; Kjeldsen & Bøtcher 
Jacobsen, 2013; Saks & Ashforth, 1997) arguing that 
bureaucrats in units with different tasks experience dif-
ferent socialization processes (Moyson et al., 2018).
We propose a typology of three task-related groups of 
SCS: strategists (i.e. SCS with responsibility for political 
planning, coordination and immediate executive staff), 
policy specialists (i.e. SCS who provide expertise on sub-
stantive policies and draft policy proposals), and transversal 
services administrators (i.e. SCS with responsibility for 
administrative tasks such as budgetary matters, human 
resources, legal services or organization of the ministry, 
in the following short referred to as ‘administrators’). This 
typology is applied to test the effect of task on SCS’ role 
perceptions.
To explore role perceptions, this study draws on the 
seminal Comparative Elite Study (Aberbach et al., 1981; 
Mayntz & Derlien, 1989) that identified ten typical roles 
of SCS. These 10 typical roles are organized into two 
groups: reactive roles and active roles. Reactive roles 
reflect the Weberian image of impartial bureaucrats 
with “inward-looking role patterns” (Trondal et al., 
2018, p. 87), who serve the common good and give 
sound advice to the government but are reluctant in 
playing an active role in political decision-making pro-
cesses. Reactive roles are the following fives roles: expert 
role, broker role, role as implementer of policy goals, 
trustee role and legalist role. Active roles reflect a more 
politically entrepreneurial role-understanding where 
SCS stand up for specific societal groups or interests, 
and are more actively involved in political decision- 
making. Active roles are the following five roles: 
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advocacy role, the facilitator/agent role, the partisan 
role, the ombudsman role and the initiator role (for 
a more detailed description of all roles see section 3 
and Mayntz & Derlien, 1989).
In public debate as well as in academic literature on 
politicization of bureaucracy, reactive and active roles 
are often considered as opposite poles and mutually 
exclusive (see Wise, 2004, p. 672; critically West, 2005). 
The analysis presented in this article confirms that this 
assumption is too simplistic as a high identification with 
reactive roles – which is traditionally widespread and 
deeply institutionalized in countries with a long tradi-
tion in bureaucratic impartiality – does not exclude that 
SCS also identify themselves with more active roles.
Empirical data stem from the German Political- 
Administrative Elite (PAE) survey in 2017. The data 
cover a full inventory of SCS in three upper hierarchical 
ranks (level 2 to 4, covering heads of directorates, heads 
of sub-directorates and heads of divisions1; n = 604) in 
federal ministries in Germany.
Theoretical framework
Task matters: SCS as heterogeneous group
In recent years, the importance of individual-level 
aspects in explaining administrative behavior has been 
emphasized by research into motivation and commit-
ment, role perceptions, identity and functional politici-
zation of SCS. The point of departure for much of this 
research is the considerable discretion at the disposal of 
SCS (see Putnam, 1976, p. 87). SCS can draw on several 
alternative sources of legitimation for their actions (as 
e.g., political objectives of the government of the day, 
professional norms or standards, or loyalty towards the 
common good). Which of these sources is prioritized by 
the SCS and the role they hence take and the decisions 
they make depends on pre- and post-recruitment factors 
(Trondal et al., 2018). We focus on the latter aspect, that 
is “the social context and situation in which they find 
themselves” (Ehn et al., 2003, p. 437).
With regard to post-recruitment factors influencing 
role perceptions, several scholars emphasize (hierarchi-
cal) position as explanatory factor (e.g., Aberbach et al., 
1981; Christensen, 1991; Ebinger et al. 2018; Ehn et al., 
2003). Another post-recruitment factor that has been 
investigated in the literature is ministries’ and agencies’ 
“different functions within different technical and poli-
tical task environments” (West, 2005, p. 157). The orga-
nizations’ different functions contribute to frame the 
individual organization members’ role perceptions and 
attitudes (Blomdahl, 2016; Ehn et al., 2003; Trondal, 
2006). However, none of the work applying this 
“organizational specialization” perspective (Trondal 
et al., 2018, p. 90) controls for intra-organizational spe-
cializations, i.e. they restrict analysis to the organiza-
tional macro- or departmental level. Job related 
aspects, such as work-role choices or tasks, to our 
knowledge, never have been put to test.2 To the best of 
our knowledge, no study links specific tasks of SCS to 
their individual role perceptions, attitudes or behavior. 
Thus, we still know astonishingly little about this essen-
tial scope condition that might promote distinct role 
perceptions. This research gap can be explained by the 
original focus of research in SCS, addressing often the 
highest echelons of SCS only. These CEO-style actors at 
the top of a hierarchical line-organization hardly differ 
in their all-encompassing portfolio of tasks. Moreover, 
issues of data availability could have hindered more 
detailed analyses on this highly sensible group.
Picking up Rouban’s (2004) notion of politicization ex 
officio, meaning politicization by mere contact with inher-
ently political issues and tasks, we assume that not all SCS 
within one government department are equally exposed 
to political tasks. We propose a framework of three types 
of tasks with different degrees of politicization ex officio. 
The first type of tasks is politics-related. Those tasks are 
characterized by a high politicization ex officio. Examples 
are policy coordination tasks and tasks related to the 
development of core policy programs and political strate-
gies. The second task type is expert policy work. This 
includes, in particular, the preparation of policies and 
draft laws, policy advice to the minister, and the execution 
and evaluation of policies. SCS performing expert policy 
work – we call them policy specialists – are regularly 
confronted with political considerations when perform-
ing their work. There are, however, ups and downs in 
political attention dependent on the topic at hand. The 
third type is administrative tasks. Every ministerial 
department needs an internal administration, which pro-
vides transversal services – i.e. tasks that are not directly 
related to the policy portfolio of the ministry such as 
personnel management, budget affairs or organizational 
affairs. SCS with mainly such administrative duties are 
considered to perform tasks with a low degree of politici-
zation ex officio. Based on the three types of tasks we 
differentiate three groups of SCS: strategists, policy specia-
lists, and administrators.
Capturing patterns of variation: Role perceptions of 
SCS
In line with Ehn et al. (2003, p. 438), we define the term 
role as “attitudes and behaviors structured around 
rights, obligations, and tasks that are connected to 
a specific social position.” Role perceptions are voiced 
2 F. EBINGER ET AL.
representations of the roles SCS identify with; they are 
considered as “generalized receipts for action as well as 
normative systems of self-reference that provide codes 
for behavioral choices and feelings of allegiance to orga-
nizational members” (Trondal et al., 2018, p. 92; cf. Bevir 
et al., 2003, pp. 4ff.). Analyzing actor-level role percep-
tions in organization-related research has several merits: 
First, it is individuals, not organizations, who make 
available discretion real (Trondal et al., 2015). Second, 
this approach provides an integrated look at the “system 
of social regulations” and the individual actor, whose 
behavior is shaped by, but also modifies the surrounding 
structures (Ehn et al., 2003, p. 437). Finally, role percep-
tions are fairly easily derived and can be considered valid 
proxies for behavioral patterns and choices (Ehn et al., 
2003, p. 438 f.; Trondal et al., 2018, pp. 85, 92).
Wise (2004, p. 672) points to the long tradition of 
using role categories to investigate representation and 
bureaucratic behavior, starting with Pitkin (1967) and 
Dogan (1975). Research on administrative elites early on 
differentiated SCS into distinct groups concerning their 
role perceptions. For instance, Putnam (1976) differen-
tiated conventional and political bureaucrats. The pivo-
tal Comparative Elite Study by Aberbach et al. (1981) 
theoretically derived four role images of SCS and politi-
cians in policy-making, ranging from a strict separation 
of their roles to total hybridization. However, these 
images resemble ideal types, which are not captured in 
a straightforward way empirically. Several more recent 
studies set out to identify groups of civil servants based 
on role perceptions. Jacobsen (1996) surveyed agency 
heads at the municipal level in Norway on their stance 
towards bureaucratic roles and behavior. He empirically 
derived four groups of bureaucrats: the political bureau-
crat, the autonomous bureaucrat, the classic administra-
tor and the ’linking pin’ (who acts as a citizens’ 
advocate). Ehn et al. (2003) differentiate between the 
(more) judicial, political and – following the call of 
the day – market-oriented civil servant. Peters (2009) 
gets closer to the operational level by identifying five 
roles public servants (across all levels) might take: the 
traditional bureaucrat (who is primarily oriented 
towards formal rules as well as fair and equal treatment 
of citizens in policy implementation), the manager 
(whose main focus is on improving the efficiency of 
public service delivery and who has a more autonomous 
self-understanding), the policy-maker (who has 
a powerful policy role), the negotiator (who organizes, 
coordinates and supervises service delivery by public 
and private actors) and the democrat (who stabilizes 
democracy). Peters’ model is designed to cover the 
whole public service. For in-depth analyses of SCS in 
government departments, those differentiations might 
still be too superficial (according to Peters, those SCS 
are particularly associated with the policy role), and the 
intermingling of functional and attitudinal aspects 
might bias results.3
One is tempted to interpret all these exercises as 
variations of the fundamental tension between neutral 
competence (based on what?) versus political responsive-
ness (towards whom?) (West, 2005, p. 148 f.; 
Wockelberg, 2014), especially as this dichotomous clas-
sification seems to have a strong appeal to SCSs them-
selves (Cooper, 2018, p. 36). However, scholars early on 
criticized the artificiality of such an antagonism (Heclo, 
1975, p. 83), and many scholars since argued for 
a duality of both core role conceptions (e.g., 
Christensen, 1991; Trondal et al., 2018). This might be 
particularly true for the German case, as SCS “need both 
professional expertise and political craft” (Jann & Veit, 
2021, p. 158).
Based on this line of thought, we argue for an approach 
that covers a broader range of role conceptions as in the 
examples presented above. To do so, we apply a more com-
prehensive model of SCS behavior developed by Aberbach 
et al. (1981) in the Comparative Elite Study. This study not 
only captured role images, but the respondents’ professional 
roles (labelled as job aspects at the time) as well. With ten 
categories addressing various societal stakeholders in the 
administrative process, this approach differentiates the erst-
while dichotomous perspective (Aberbach et al., 1981, 
pp. 86ff.). By classifying those professional roles into two 
more concise but per se compatible clusters, it becomes 
possible to capture the degree to which the respondents 
embrace reactive role perceptions, and to which degree 
they identify with active or ‘politically entrepreneurial’ role 
perceptions.
Hypotheses
We argue that individual tasks and responsibilities 
might be interlinked with SCS’ role perceptions. The 
theoretical reasoning behind this argument can be 
found in organizational socialization literature. In vary-
ing contexts, organizational affiliation effects and hier-
archy effects have been investigated. Several public 
sector studies build on an institutionalist perspective 
on socialization (Simon, 1997). Many underline that 
the (hierarchical) organizational position influences 
civil servants’ role perceptions, attitudes and behavior 
(e.g., Christensen & Lægreid, 2009; Christensen & 
Opstrup, 2018; Egeberg, 2012; Raudla et al., 2021). The 
mechanism behind this process, however, seems not to 
be grounded in hierarchy per se, but might be based on 
the duties associated with a certain hierarchy level. The 
hierarchical position might influence role perceptions 
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and behavior because the tasks associated with a specific 
position and the demands on the position holder influ-
ence their perspective and assessment of situations.
Based on findings in socialization research (Ashforth, 
2001; Hatmaker et al., 2011; Saks & Ashforth, 1997), we 
assume that individuals entering a new position rapidly 
get involved in task-related peer networks and are hence 
coached swiftly into the role expectations of a specific 
position. However, in line with the advanced discussion 
in the literature, we would not limit socialization pro-
cesses to an entrants’ onboarding or ‘breaking in’ period, 
neither consider it a continuous, more or less linear 
process (Oberfield, 2014, p. 15). We assume that socia-
lization is a continuous, but nonlinear process. Changes 
in the organizational environment or changes in tasks 
might presumably lead to rapid shifts in role perception 
and attitudes (Murdoch et al., 2019). As Peters asserts, 
contemporary public servants have “to adjust their beha-
vior to (. . .) multiple expectations (. . .) [and] may be 
changing their roles from time to time” (Peters, 2009, 
p. 16) dependent on the tasks that have to be performed. 
Or, as (Ashforth, 2001, p. 9) frames it: we are “indivi-
duals in flux”. One could even argue that individual SCS 
might have risen fast on the career ladder because they 
were able to adjust to new demands faster than others. 
This swift adaption would explain the observation of 
hierarchical effects on attitudes and behavior despite 
the common selection and bureaucratic socialization 
processes all civil servants undergo. All this leads us to 
assume that not (only) a person’s hierarchical position 
but also the tasks and duties associated with a position 
affect role perceptions.
We hypothesize that such a differentiated effect on 
role perceptions should be observable for the three 
task-related groups of SCS (strategists, policy specia-
lists and administrators). As outlined above, these three 
groups have substantially diverging core tasks with 
strongly differing degrees of politicization ex officio: 
Strategists have to deal with political considerations 
on a daily basis, as essential part of their job. Policy 
specialists focus primarily on the professional aspects 
related to their tasks, and only on a secondary basis 
reflect political implications. Administrators are con-
cerned with organizational issues internal to their 
department. Their tasks are usually remote from poli-
tics. Based on the assumption that reactive roles are 
most appealing for SCS with a low politicization ex 
officio while active roles are most attractive for SCS 
with a strong politicization ex officio, we expect reactive 
role perceptions to be least relevant for strategists and 
most relevant for administrators, with policy specialists 
taking a middle position (H 1). Active roles should be 
most relevant for strategists and particularly 
unappealing for administrators, with policy specialists 
again taking a middle position (H 2).
Data and Methods
The hypotheses introduced above are tested with data 
gathered by the German PAE survey in 2017.4 The 
selected sample covers SCS positions in federal minis-
tries from the second to fourth hierarchical level. SCS at 
level 1 (administrative state secretaries) were removed 
from the sample as they are both few in numbers and, as 
the highest echelon of the ministerial hierarchy, do 
usually not differ in a similar manner as SCS at lower 
levels with regard to their task. Level 2 includes direc-
tors-general5; level 3 includes heads of sub-directorates, 
heads of leadership staff units (Leitungsstab) and heads 
of minister’s office; level 4 includes heads of sections and 
heads of staff units (excluding heads of leadership staff 
units). PAE 2017 contacted all 1,922 level 2 to 4-SCS in 
12 federal ministries6 and reached a response rate of 
31.4% (N = 604).
The independent variable (task-related groups of 
SCS) was operationalized as follows: To assign each 
SCS to one of the three task-related groups (strategists, 
policy specialists, administrators), we used a survey 
question asking for the respondent’s organizational 
unit. All respondents who reported to be working in 
a leadership staff unit or in units responsible for strategy 
and planning or coordination were categorized as stra-
tegists. All respondents who reported to be working in 
a policy unit were categorized as policy specialists. 
Respondents who reported to work in an administrative 
support unit were classified as administrators. The sam-
ple consists of 139 strategists, 401 policy specialists and 
64 transversal services administrators. In regression ana-
lyses, we consider policy specialists as reference category 
when analyzing the influence of ‘task’ on SCS’ role 
perceptions. The control variables included in regres-
sion analyses are presented in Table 1.
To measure SCS’ role perceptions, we draw on the 
pivotal Comparative Elite Study (Aberbach et al., 1981; 
Mayntz & Derlien, 1989). As outlined above, those studies 
revealed ten typical role perceptions of SCS. We categor-
ized those ten role perceptions into reactive and active 
roles (see Table 2) and composed two formative indices, 
the Active Role Model (ARM) the Reactive Role Model 
(RRM). PAE 2017 captures all ten roles by a four-point 
Likert scale (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = 
strongly agree). For the single-item analyses, the 
responses were recoded into dummy variables, displaying 
whether the respondents are leaning towards the pro-
posed model, or not. To form the indices RRM and 
ARM the mean values of the included items were used, 
4 F. EBINGER ET AL.
when responses were available for at least four of the five 
items. Thus, the minimum value of both the ARM and 
the RRM Index is 1 (strong disagreement) and the max-
imum value 4 (strong agreement). For the ARM Index 
Cronbach’s Alpha lies at 0.41 and for the RRM Index at 
0,35. As Cronbach’s Alpha is based on the number of 
items and as measuring role models by only five single 
variables is quite complex the low reliability of both 
indices is not a major impediment to its use. However, 
neither the RRM nor ARM roles are the expression of 
a “shared, common perception of the concept” (Willems 
et al., 2014, p. 1656) as in reflexive constructs. SCS might 
well diverge in their understanding of the duties a SCS 
conventionally has to cover when fulfilling either 
a supportive, reactive role, or an active role. From 
a methodological point of view, these role models are 
considered to cause the latent variables RRM and ARM, 
and hence compose a formative index (Diamantopoulos 
& Winklhofer, 2001, pp. 269–270). Thus, all the items are 
part of the respective theoretical concept (see Table 2).
Empirical findings and discussion
To test the hypotheses, we conducted an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), post hoc tests and OLS regression 
analyses on the two role-model indices ARM and RRM. 
To explain the observed differences between groups, we 
conducted regressions on the ten single roles.
For the RRM index, the identification turns out to be 
high throughout all three task-related groups of SCS (see 
Table 3). The OLS regression displays the relationship 
between the three task-related groups of SCS and the 
ARM Index in different models (see Figure 1 for 
a selection of four out of eight models tested). 
Throughout all models, we find no significant group 
effect, i.e. no significant differences in identification 
can be observed between strategists, policy specialists 
and administrators. When including all controls, only 
having completed studies in law has a significant posi-
tive effect on the RRM Index. All other variables have no 
significant effect (see Figure 1, model 8).
For the ARM index, the ANOVA reports statistically 
significant differences between the three task-related 
groups [(F 2, 556) = 6,36, p = .002)]. However, Tukey- 
HSD and Game-Howell post hoc tests reveal that strate-
gists and policy specialists do not differ significantly, but 
that both groups deviate significantly from the 
administrators.
The OLS regression (see Figure 2) displays the rela-
tionship between the three task-related groups of SCS 
and the ARM Index in different models. Throughout all 
models, we find a clear group effect: working as admin-
istrator makes it considerably and statistically signifi-
cantly less likely to associate strongly with an active 
role model. Working as a strategist has no significant 
effect, i.e. policy specialists as reference group seem to be 
about equally likely to associate with this role model as 
strategists. The control variables show no stronger and 
significant effects with the exception of federal ministry 
(see Figure 2).
Based on the findings from OLS-regressions, H1 has 
to be rejected as there are no significant group differ-
ences concerning the reactive role model index. H2 can 
(partly) be confirmed. The expected relation – more 
politicized tasks being linked to more active role 
Table 1. Controls, captured as dummy variables (yes = 1).
Variables
Sex (female) Ministry 
Interior 
Justice and Consumer Protection 
Labour and Social Affairs 
Economy and Energy 
Education and Research 
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, 
Women and Youth 




Transport and Digital Infrastructure 
Food and Agriculture 
Economic Cooperation and 
Development






Political civil servant (hierarchical 
level 2)
Declared Party membership
Field of study (law degree)
Work experience outside public 
administration
Table 2. Role models.
Role
Active or reactive role? Description Does the respondent understand himself/herself as . . . ?#
R1 Expert role Reactive Expert with specific problem solving capacity
R2 Advocacy role Active Advocate for broader societal groups or demands
R3 Agent/Facilitator role Active Agent for specific organized interests
R4 Broker role Reactive Broker between conflicting interests
R5 Implementer of political goals Reactive Implementer of political goals
R6 Partisan role Active Partisan bound to enforce a political program
R7 Trustee role Reactive Representative of the state
R8 Legalist role Reactive Implementer of law
R9 Ombudsman role Active Citizen advocate dealing with individual problems
R10 Initiator role Active Initiator of new projects and problem solutions
Sources: Mayntz and Derlien (1989); Derlien (2003).
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models – exists for policy specialists and strategists vis 
a vis administrators but not for strategists compared to 
policy specialists.
To explain these results and to scrutinize whether 
belonging to a specific task-related group indeed is asso-
ciated with the taking of distinct roles, we conducted 
a linear regression and interpreted Odds Ratios (OR) to 
evaluate changes associated with factors and covariates 
on each of the proposed roles (R1 to R10). Table 3 shows 
how frequently the three task-related groups of SCS 
identify with the proposed roles. The table moreover 
presents the results of Pearson’s chi-square test on the 
relationship between the three groups of SCS. It reveals 
that the stance of the three groups towards the ten roles 
is not uniform.
There is no statistically significant variation (p < .05) 
between the three task-related groups of SCS and their 
identification with the expert role, the broker role, the 
agent/facilitator role and the ombudsman role. All three 
groups of SCS identify rather strongly with the reactive 
roles as expert and broker (see Table 3). These two roles 
can hence be considered as universally accepted core of 
bureaucratic roles to which all SCS, no matter what their 
particular task is, adhere to. Throughout all three task- 
related groups of SCS the identification with the wo 
active roles as facilitator/agent and ombudsman is rather 
low. The facilitator/agent role is unanimously rejected 
by SCS in all three task-related groups, even by those 
who experience a strong politicization ex officio. This 
role might be too explicitly in contradiction with the 
established and deeply institutionalized principle of 
bureaucratic impartiality. A feasible explanation for the 
consistently rather low identification with the ombuds-
man role is that this role is simply beyond the scope of 
what SCS in Germany commonly consider to be their 
job. German civil servants traditionally consider them-
selves first and foremost as representatives of the state, 
and not as citizen representatives, investigating viola-
tions of rights of individuals or specific societal groups 
(Jann & Veit, 2021; Mayntz & Derlien, 1989).7
There is a statistically significant (p < .05) but mostly 
rather small (Cramer-V < .20) relation between the three 
task-related groups of SCS and their identification with 
six out of ten roles (R2/R5/R6/R7/R8/R10, see Table 3). 
The main driver for the significant differences is the 
group of administrators: In five of the six roles (R2/R5/ 
R7/R8/R10) there are considerable differences between 
administrators and the other two groups, whereas the 
identification of policy specialists and strategists with the 
proposed roles coincides. Administrators identify less 
with the advocacy role, role of implementer of political 
goals, trustee role and initiator role, but considerably 
more with the legalist role than their peers. R6 (partisan 
role) is the only exception to this scheme, as it is very 
strongly rejected by both policy specialists and adminis-
trators, and somewhat less so by strategist.
Comparing the measures of central tendency of ARM 
and RRM across the three task-related groups (see Table 
3), it becomes apparent that SCS in all three groups tend 
to see their own role rather as a reactive than an active 
one. The mean of all groups is considerably lower for the 
ARM Index than for the RRM Index.
When scrutinizing relevant covariates for the identi-
fication with RRM and ARM, several important obser-
vations have been made.
First, for RRM the strong association with having 
received a law degree is undeniable. A law degree has 
for a long time been the norm for entering the senior 
civil service in Germany. This has changed gradually 
over the last decades. Nevertheless, lawyers still form 
Table 3. Identification with role models, differences across groups.
Role Model                                        
Strategists Policy Specialist Administrators Pearson’s χ2 test Cramer-VNo. Label Active or Reactive
R1 Expert role Reactive 88,8% 93.9% 90.5% 4.10 .083
R2 Advocacy role Active 43.2% 47.5% 21.1% 14,10** .159**
R3 Facilitator/Agent role Active 5.6% 6.5% 8.5% .52 .031
R4 Broker Reactive 78.8% 78.9% 72.1% 1.46 .050
R5 Implementer of political goals Reactive 88.3% 87.4% 74.6% 7.64* .115*
R6 Partisan role Active 12.8% 2.4% 5.1% 21.01*** .195***
R7 Trustee role Reactive 84.6% 87.1% 73.3% 7.83* .116*
R8 Legalist role Reactive 28.6% 37.4% 60% 17.15*** .175***
R9 Ombudsman role Active 23.2% 15.8% 16.9% 3.54 .080








Index Reactive Role 2.97 .41 3.06 .39 3.04 .49
Index Active Role 2.04 .40 1.99 .36 1.81 .45
Source: PAE 2017. 
Percent values refer to the share of respondents in the three groups who reported to (completely) agree with the role model; * (p < .05) at Pearson’s 
χ2 test.
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the largest group among SCS today (Strobel et al., 2021, 
p. 19). Critics of the high share of lawyers in the German 
SCS argue that this undermines innovation and a change 
towards a more policy- and output-oriented and less 
legalist administrative culture (Reichard, 2014). Our 
findings confirm this: lawyers in SCS positions help to 
cement the strong legalistic administrative culture in 
Germany.
Second, despite the extensive discussion on the deci-
sion-making effects of party politicization, our analysis 
reveals that party membership is no relevant explanatory 
factor for both role model indices. Party members seem 
to have internalized the traditional (reactive) civil ser-
vice role perceptions and norms to the same extent as 
their colleagues (see also Ebinger et al., 2019), and they 
do not differ significantly from their peers without party 
membership in the appreciation or rejection of active 
roles. The only exception from this pattern can be found 
for R6 (partisan role). Party members identify them-
selves significantly stronger (p < .05; Pearson’s χ2 = 
29.60; Cramer-V .23) with this role than non-party 
members. While only very few SCS without party 
Figure 1. OLS-regression: Group x reactive role model index. Source: PAE 2017.Notes: Unstandardized coefficients reported with 
standard errors in parentheses. Federal ministries (see Table 1) are included as system level controls into the equation. 
* (p < .05) ** (p  < .01) *** (p < .001)
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membership identify themselves with this role (1.8%), 
the identification of party members with this role is 
considerably higher (12.9%) – but still on a low level.
Third, another noteworthy finding concerns inter- 
departmental differences. SCS working in selected fed-
eral ministries, namely the Ministry for Family Affairs, 
Senior Citizens, Women and Youth and the Ministry for 
the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety, share a more active definition of their roles than 
their colleagues in other ministries. This might indicate 
that interest representation is considered more 
legitimate by SCS when they represent broad but rather 
weak societal interests. The investigation of inter- 
departmental differences with regard to SCS’ role per-
ceptions is a fruitful avenue for future research.
Conclusion
This contribution challenges the widespread assumption 
in public administration literature that SCS can be con-
sidered (and explored) as homogeneous group. We 
argue that the view on SCS in previous research might 
Figure 2. OLS-regression: Group x active bureaucrat index. Source: PAE 2017.Notes: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard 
errors in parentheses. Federal ministries (see Table 1) are included as system level controls into the equation.* (p < .05) ** (p < .01) *** 
(p < .001)
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be biased, as studies on role perceptions or decision- 
making rationalities commonly ignore the specific task 
of SCS as individual level scope condition. In this article, 
we tested this claim. Illustrated by the analysis of new 
survey data from Germany, several major contributions 
can be drawn from our study.
First, the division of SCS into three task-related 
groups – strategists, policy specialists, and administra-
tors – depending on their politicization ex officio has 
proved to be feasible. The operationalization applied in 
this study to assign SCS to the three groups is indepen-
dent from country-specific characteristics, and could 
thus easily be applied in future studies on SCS in other 
countries and for comparative research on this topic. 
The same applies to the formative indices – RRM and 
ARM – used in this study.
Second, the empirical findings presented in this arti-
cle enhance our knowledge on the antecedents of SCS’ 
role perceptions and decision-making behavior, as we 
supplement commonly used aspects as formal position 
and hierarchy with the tasks SCS are entrusted with. The 
claim that individual tasks are a relevant scope condi-
tion, was confirmed empirically. We found substantial 
differences across the three task-related sub-groups of 
SCS (strategists, policy specialists and administrators) 
concerning their role perceptions. Strategists and policy 
specialists are much more inclined to achieve high 
values in the identification with the active role model 
than administrators. When investigating role percep-
tions, SCS should hence be differentiated into subgroups 
to avoid biased or blurred results.
Third, we identified+ the reactive role model as 
base model of SCS behavior in Germany. All task- 
related groups of SCS identify strongly with reactive 
(supportive) roles, in particular with the expert role 
and the broker role. This resembles the deeply insti-
tutionalized self-image of an impartial bureaucrat 
that serves the government of the day. SCS entrusted 
with more politically salient tasks are likely to show 
a higher identification with active roles – in addition 
to their high identification with reactive roles. These 
findings are of high theoretical importance, as they 
confirm the claim that active and reactive role mod-
els are not irreconcilable, but complementary 
(Ebinger et al., 2019).
Fourth, while we cannot contribute to the debate on 
causal mechanisms linking antecedents and scope con-
ditions to individual level traits, our results challenge 
common socialization theories. Even though we know 
from biographical research that there is substantial 
movement of SCS across positions and tasks within 
one ministry, the actors seem to exhibit a specific stance 
related to their actual position. Albeit substantial 
progress has been made in understanding socialization 
processes within organizations (Beyers, 2010; Trondal 
et al., 2018), further theory development and empirical 
testing is warranted. Beyond a linear understanding of 
socialization as an ongoing process deepening over time, 
new environments, critical events and changing respon-
sibilities and tasks might indeed be much more relevant 
for the socialization of mature actors in later stages of 
career.
Note that the approach presented here to test the 
assumption of homogeneity of role models across dif-
ferent task-related groups of SCS is not suited to claim 
causal inference on the reasons for the variation discov-
ered. Whether this effect is based on pre-recruiting 
differences of SCS in the three categories, or whether 
this proves the socializing capacity of (bureaucratic) 
organizations is beyond the scope of our investigation. 
Even though we assume a post-recruitment effect, we 
cannot say with confidence whether the socialization 
process which might take place here is the result of 
a long-term exposure to a distinct environment (actors 
and institutions), or whether the acquisition of the 
observed set of role perceptions is the result of an ad 
hoc process, initiated by the take-over of certain tasks 
which bring about an environment with a distinct set of 
actors and exigencies.
Moreover, as all survey-based analyses on sensitive 
topics, the issue of social desirability bias has to be 
raised. For example, we observe a consistently high 
appraisal of RRM across all groups. This could indicate 
‘clear social norms regarding a given behavior or atti-
tude’ (Tourangeau & Yan, 2007, p. 860). As the 
‘Weberian’, serving role model is deeply institutiona-
lized and central to SCS’ job description in meritocratic 
bureaucracies in Western democracies, we are inclined 
to give credence to the idea that the reported role model 
mirrors a fundamental trait, and not just hypocrisy. 
Moreover, as ARM shows substantial variation across 
task-related groups, no systematic levelling of effect is 
observed. Thus, although “impression management” 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2015) will possibly occur among such 
rather exposed respondents, we do not expect 
a systematic bias in the responses.
The most important lesson learnt from this study is 
that future research on SCS should apply a differentiated 
approach to explore role perceptions of SCS. Knowledge 
about disparate groups formed by varying tasks within 
bureaucracy is crucial to link and interpret the manifold 
data on SCS in a meaningful manner. Undifferentiated 
examinations ignoring this important scope condition 
might lead to biased results either by masking effects or 
by over- or misinterpreting effects because of inconside-
rate sample selection.
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Notes
1. Level 1 (the Secretaries of State) is left out due to its 
small number and overwhelmingly political character.
2. One exception – albeit not applicable for SCS – is Camilleri 
(2007), who uses the Job Characteristics Inventory (JCI) by 
Sims et al. (1976) and covers skill variety, task autonomy, 
task identity, task feedback, friendship opportunities, deal-
ing with others and task significance.
3. A broad strand of research applied role-based analyses 
in international organizations, with a focus on assumed 
tensions between core roles SCS are committed to e.g., 
Hooghe (2005); Trondal (2006). However, role defini-
tions in this strand of research (e.g., Trondal’s ‘decision- 
making dynamics’ labeled as intergovernmental, supra-
national, departmental, and epistemic roles) are 
strongly geared towards sources of, and conflicts 
between loyalties. Specific tasks forming functional 
epistemic communities within departments are not 
addressed see also Trondal et al. (2018).
4. PAE 2017 belongs to a series of online surveys in 
Germany (partly) based on the questionnaire of the 
Comparative Elite Study initiated by Aberbach et al. 
(1981). The survey covers SCS in federal and state 
ministries, federal agencies and ministerial research 
institutions.
5. Directors-general (level 2) are political civil servants 
(politische Beamte), who can be dismissed at any time 
by the minister, while all SCS at lower hierarchical levels 
are in permanent positions (Jann & Veit, 2021, p. 148).
6. The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal 
Ministry of Defence were excluded from the analysis 
due to their different staff structure.
7. However, this stance might change with the rise of 
identity politics, when active representation by “provid-
ing a voice for societal interests” gains importance in the 
(individual) mission statement and self-understanding 
of SCS (see Piatak et al., 2020).
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